Abstract SPKI/SDSI is a language for expressing distributed access control policy, derived from SPKI and SDSI. We provide a first-order logic (FOL) semantics for SDSI, and show that it has several advantages over previous semantics. For example, the FOL semantics is easily extended to additional policy concepts and gives meaning to a larger class of access control and other policy analysis queries. We prove that the FOL semantics is equivalent to the string rewriting semantics used by SDSI designers, for all queries associated with the rewriting semantics. We also provide a FOL semantics for SPKI/SDSI and use it to analyze the design of SPKI/SDSI. This reveals some problems. For example, the standard proof procedure in RFC 2693 is semantically incomplete. In addition, as noted before by other authors, authorization tags in SPKI/SDSI are algorithmically problematic, making a complete proof procedure unlikely. We compare SPKI/SDSI with RT C 1 , which is a language in the RT Role-based Trust-management framework that can be viewed as an extension of SDSI. The constraint feature of RT C 1 , based on Constraint Datalog, provides an alternative mechanism that is expressively similar to SPKI/SDSI tags, semantically natural, and algorithmically tractable.
Introduction
In 1996, Rivest and Lampson [30] proposed a public-key infrastructure, called the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI), featuring the use of linked local names. Contemporaneously, Ellison et al. developed the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI), which emphasizes delegation of authorization. In 1997, the two efforts were merged, leading to a system called SPKI/SDSI. The standard reference on SPKI/SDSI is RFC 2693 [10] , with a later paper [7] , whose authors include several designers of SPKI/SDSI, providing certificate chain reduction algorithms for SPKI/SDSI, clearer descriptions of many features, and certain minor design changes.
SPKI/SDSI can be viewed as a trust-management (TM) language. Trust management [5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 22, 24, 26, 30] is a distributed access control concept with access decisions based on policy statements made by multiple principals. In a typical trust management system, principals are identified with public keys, and statements that are maintained in a distributed manner are often digitally signed to ensure their authenticity and integrity. Such signed statements are called credentials or certificates. In general, a TM language has a syntax for specifying policy statements and queries, together with an entailment relation . Given a state P and a query Q, the relation P Q means that Q is true in P. When Q arises from an access request, P Q means that access Q is allowed in P.
In SPKI/SDSI, policy statements take the form of namedefinition certificates (name certs), authorization certificates (auth certs), and Access Control List (ACL) entries. Principals are identified with public keys, and each principal has its own name spaces for names. A local name, which is identified by a principal and an identifier, is bound to a set of principals that we call the members of the local name. Intuitively, the local name K A is the principal K 's interpretation of the identifier A. Only the principal K can issue name certs that determine members of the local name K A. Principal K can define K A to include a principal, a local name, or a linked local name (also called an extended name). We use SDSI to refer to the sub-language of SPKI/SDSI that just has name certs, also called 4-tuples. Auth certs and ACL entries, also called 5-tuples, originally came from SPKI. In a 5-tuple, the issuing principal grants certain authorization to a subject, which can be a principal, a local name, an extended name, or a threshold subject. The issuing principal also specifies whether the subject can further delegate the authorization it receives in a 5-tuple.
A set of SPKI/SDSI statements defines a policy, and many properties of a policy are of interest to its authors and users. The most basic query is whether a policy allows a principal to access a resource. However, it may also be important to determine safety and availability properties of a policy [25] , such as whether a resource owner still has some guarantees about who can access their resources after delegating limited authority to other principals. RFC 2693 does not explicitly specify a class of queries that can be made against a policy, but provides operational rules for producing new 5-tuples from existing 5-tuples. The 5-tuple reductions implicitly define a class of access queries for SPKI/SDSI as well as a proof procedure for answering these queries.
The semantics of SPKI/SDSI has attracted a lot of interest in the security research community. Beginning with Abadi [1] , significant effort has gone into finding a logic-based semantics for both SDSI naming alone and SPKI/SDSI. A logic developed by Howell and Kotz [14] extends the ABLP logic [2, 19] with a restricted form of delegation and provides a semantics for SPKI/SDSI authorization. Halpern and van der Meyden subsequently developed the Logic of Local Name Containment (LLNC) [11] and extended the logic to deal with 5-tuples in SPKI [12] . These studies all use specialized propositional modal logics. Li [20] provides a logic programming based reading for SPKI/SDSI, which can be used to answer a limited class of queries.
A formal semantics for SPKI/SDSI defines a class of queries that can be asked against a set of SPKI/SDSI statements, together with an entailment relation that determines whether a query follows from a set of SPKI/SDSI statements. For example, in a logic-based semantics for SPKI/SDSI, each statement (a 4-tuple or a 5-tuple) is translated into a logical formula, and a set of SPKI/SDSI statements is translated into a logical theory. Each query is also translated into a logical formula. The entailment relation answers whether a logical formula is entailed by a theory. This can be defined by some standard notion of logical entailment or a specialized deduction system invented for SPKI/SDSI.
A good formal semantics should achieve the following four goals. First, the class of queries supported by the semantics should be large and include those that have security significance. Second, the entailment relation should be natural and faithful to the intuition underlying the design of SPKI/SDSI. Third, the entailment should provide a basis for comparing the various deduction mechanisms associated with SPKI/SDSI and evaluating them. Fourth, the entailment provided by the semantics should be well understood and well studied. A good semantics may also allow techniques developed for other purposes to be brought to bear on SPKI/SDSI deduction.
In the present paper, we show that standard first-order logic (FOL) provides a natural semantics for SPKI/SDSI and that the FOL semantics has several advantages over previous approaches. In our study of the SDSI naming portion of SPKI/SDSI (Sect. 2 of this paper), we present a FOL semantics based on translating each name cert into a Datalog clause. Datalog is a limited form of logic programming that does not have function symbols (except for zero-ary functions). Since Datalog is a subset of FOL, this leads to a FOL semantics; since Datalog has a computational interpretation, a set of name certs induces a Datalog program. Since the semantics of a policy is defined by classical logical implication, this approach allows FOL formulas to be understood as meaningful queries against a policy. We prove that the FOL semantics is equivalent to the string rewriting semantics used by SDSI designers, for all queries associated with the rewriting semantics. The advantages of out FOL-based approach over previous logics are the following. It captures the setbased semantic intuition of SDSI, which is used in Clarke et al. [7] and Halpern and van der Meyden [11] . It uses classical first-order logic rather than more complex modal logics. The FOL semantics contains more information in the sense that a larger class of queries can be formulated and understood in the semantics. The semantics is easily extended to support useful extensions to SDSI; and, finally, the relationship between the FOL semantics and logic programming provides an efficient method to answer a large class of queries.
The full SPKI/SDSI has 5-tuples, which use authorization tags to describe permissions to access structured resources. In our study of full SPKI/SDSI, we use Constraint Datalog [17, 18] to provide a FOL semantics for SPKI/SDSI. We compare SPKI/SDSI with the trust management language RT C 1 [22] , which uses Constraint Datalog as its semantic foundation. The language RT C 1 [22] , which is a member of the RT family of Role-based Trust-management languages [24, 26] , may be viewed as an alternate extension of SDSI. One characteristic of RT C 1 is the use of various constraint domains to express policies about structured resources such as file hierarchies and standard concepts such as time of day or days of the week. We then give a FOL semantics for SPKI/SDSI by treating authorization tags and validity specification as constraints, and examine several design issues of SPKI/SDSI, using RT C 1 for comparison. We observe that SPKI's 5-tuple reduction procedure is semantically incomplete. One reason is that reduction does not handle union of tags. For example, if K 1 grants to K 2 in two certificates with two authorization tags (* range numeric ge 1 le 5) and (* numeric range ge 4 le 10), it is not possible to derive that K 1 grants to K 2 (* range numeric ge 2 le 7), which is a logical implication of the two 5-tuples. Another problem, first pointed out by Howell [13] , is that the intersection of two authorization tags may be a set that is not representable by any finite set of authorization tags. This suggests that no rewriting algorithm using SPKI/SDSI authorization tags can be semantically complete. Among other benefits of a logical point of view, the constraint feature of RT C 1 is expressively similar to SPKI/SDSI tags, but semantically natural and algorithmically tractable.
We give FOL semantics and equivalence results for the SDSI naming portion of SPKI/SDSI in Sect. 2, with trust management language RT C 1 [22] and Constraint Datalog in Sect. 3, and FOL semantics and analysis of SPKI/SDSI in Sect. 4. We conclude in Sect. 5.
Understanding SDSI using first-order logic
In SDSI, principals are identified with public keys. We use K to denote the set of all principals and use K , often with subscripts or superscripts, to denote a principal. An identifier is a word over some given standard alphabet. The set of all identifiers is denoted by A, and an identifier is denoted by A or B (often with subscripts). We assume that both K and A are countable. We do not consider SDSI 1.1 [30] special roots, which are identifiers that are bound to the same principal in every name space. Although it would be straightforward to treat them, they do not seem to add any special interest and they do not appear in SPKI/SDSI.
A name , called a term in [7, 16] , is a principal followed by zero or more identifiers. In addition to keys, the set S ⊆ (K ∪ A) * of names contains two other kinds of strings over K ∪ A. A local name has the form K A, where K ∈ K and A ∈ A, and an extended name is a principal followed by more than one identifier. Using N L for the set of all local names and N E for extended names, we have S = K ∪ N L ∪ N E , i.e., a name is either a principal, a local name, or an extended names.
Some authors [1, 11] also consider principal expressions that have principals occur in places other than the first place, e.g., "K 1 A 1 K 2 A 2 ". In general, such names do not add additional expressive power, as they are equivalent to names starting from the last principal occurring in them. For example, the principal expression "K 1 A 1 K 2 A 2 " is equivalent to K 2 A 2 , because a principal should be evaluated to itself in every name space. (One nuisance is when the valuation of K 1 A 1 is the empty set, in which case one may choose to evaluate K 1 A 1 K 2 A 2 to the empty set rather than to K 2 A 2 . It is unclear which choice is more meningful.) In more up-todate descriptions of SPKI/SDSI [7, 10] , such principal expressions are not allowed; therefore, we do not deal with them in this paper.
A name-definition certificate (name cert) C is a signed 4-tuple (K , A, S, V ), where -K ∈ K is a principal (public key) called the issuer. The 4-tuple is digitally signed using K −1 , the private key corresponding to K , and the signature can be verified using K . -A ∈ A is an identifier.
-S ∈ S is a name, called the subject.
-The validity specification V provides information regarding the validity of the certificate.
We say the 4-tuple (K , A, S, V ) defines the local name K A and S is the definition. In this section, we ignore the validity specification V . We assume that the validity of name certs are checked, and only valid certificates are considered. We will discuss how to handle the validity specification in the logical semantics in Sect. 4.2. When ignoring the validity specification, we may write (K , A, S, ·) for a 4-tuple.
In the rest of this section, we describe three semantics for SDSI that have appeared (sometimes implicitly) in the literature, then introduce the FOL semantics and prove its equivalence to other semantics; finally, we compare the FOL semantics with other semantics for SDSI.
2.1 A string rewriting semantics for SDSI RFC 2693 defines a 4-tuple-reduction mechanism, which Clarke et al. [7] explicitly present as string rewriting. The two 4-tuple-reductions in Sect. 6.4 of RFC 2693 are as follows:
Observe that the earlier two 4-tuple reductions are essentially string rewriting by regarding a 4-tuple (K , A, S, ·) as a rewriting rule K A → S that rewrites K A into S. When applying K A → S to a name "K A β", where β is a sequence of identifiers, one gets the name "S β".
In the rest of this paper, we often write K A → S instead of (K , A, S, ·) to represent a 4-tuple.
In Table 1 we list all arrows and derivation symbols used in this paper.
Definition 1 (rewriting semantics for SDSI: RS[P])
Give a set P of 4-tuples, let RS[P] be the set the rewriting rules Whether such a query is true or not given a set P of 4-tuples is determined by RS [P] .
We now introduce an example that we will use throughout this section. Example 1 (Running example) Consider the following set of 4-tuples.
A set P of 4-tuples gives, for every name S, a set of principals that S can rewrite into. Thus, a set of 4-tuples determines a valuation for every name, leading to the set-theoretic semantics for SDSI.
A set-theoretic semantics for SDSI
In the set-theoretic semantics for SDSI, every name has a valuation that is a set of principals. A 4-tuple "K A → S" represents a constraint requiring that the valuation of K A is a superset of the valuation of S. A set P of 4-tuples defines a valuation function V [P] : S → ℘ (K), where S is the set of all names, and ℘ (K) the power set of K, the set of all principals. Intuitively, V [P] is the least valuation function that satisfies all constraints given in P. In Definition 2 we will make this intuition precise.
This semantics is probably the one that is closest to the intuitions underlying SDSI, as SDSI is a naming scheme concerned with the valuation of names. Clarke et al. [7] use an informal description of this semantics as the semantic intuition for SDSI. Halpern and van der Meyden [11] provide a semantics for their Logic of Local Name Containment (LLNC) along similar lines. Li et al. [26] use the same idea to provide a semantics for RT 0 , which can be viewed as SDSI enhanced with the intersection operator in the subject.
The following presentation of the set-theoretic semantics follows [26] .
Definition 2 (set-theoretic semantics for SDSI: SC[P])
We first describe how a function that maps local names to sets of principals can be extended to give a valuation function that maps names to sets of principals. Given any function f : N L → ℘ (K), the valuation function induced by f , V f : S → ℘ (K), is defined as follows:
Given a set P of 4-tuples, let M[P] is the least function f : N L → ℘ (K) that satisfies the system of set containments:
We use a least-solution definition for M[P] because 4-tuples may define local names recursively.
The valuation function, V[P ], is defined to be
The following fact says that the valuation function V[P] is well defined. Proof Given P, we show that M [P] : N L → ℘ (K) uniquely exists and present a straightforward way to construct it. These suffice to prove this fact.
For each natural number
We first show that the sequence f i , i = 0, 1, . . . is nondecreasing, using an induction on i. For the base case, clearly f 0 ≤ f 1 . Assuming that f n−1 ≤ f n , we now show that f n ≤ f n+1 . It suffices to show that for any local name
. This holds because for any name S, f i−1 (S) ≤ f i (S), which follows from the induction hypothesis that f i−1 ⊆ f i and the fact that V f is defined using monotonic operators (a formal proof can be given using induction on the length of S).
The set of all functions that could appear in the sequence f 0 , f 1 , f 2 , . . . forms a finite lattice. This follows from the following two properties, which can be shown easily by induction: (1) for any local name K A not defined in P, f i (KA) = ∅ for any i ∈ N; and (2) for any local name K A and any i ∈ N, f i (K A) only contains principals occurring in P.
Therefore, the least upper bound f ω of the sequence, given by
The function f ω clearly satisfies SC [P] , and one can show by induction that any function that satisfies SC[P] is greater than or equal to f ω . P Example 2 Consider the set P of 4-tuples given in Example 1. The system of set containments determined by P is as follows: In particular,
Corollary 6 (in Sect. 2.5) says that the set-theoretic semantics contains less information than the rewriting semantics, in the following sense. If 
; the former is strictly stronger than the latter. Any query about V [P] can be expressed using string rewriting, as for any name S,
However, a string rewriting query between two names cannot be expressed using V [P] . In this sense, V [P] contains less information than the rewriting semantics.
When making access control decisions, the valuations of names are necessary, but the rewriting relationship between two names are not directly useful. However, this relation is very helpful for understanding the effect of 4-tuples. If S 1 rewrites into S 2 from P, then S 1 rewrites into S 2 from any P such that P ⊇ P; therefore, the valuation of S 1 is always a superset of the valuation of S 2 no matter what new policy statements are added. This is especially useful for studying the safety and availability properties of policies when policies may change, e.g., statements may be added and/or removed [25] .
A logic programming (LP) semantics
The set-theoretic semantics can be captured naturally using logic programs. This observation was made by Halpern and van der Meyden [11] . It was also used implicitly in the semantics of the RT framework [26, 24] . The semantics of RT 0 , the basic component of the RT framework, was first defined using sets [26] . When additional features, such as internal structures in role terms (correspond to identifiers in SDSI) are added, a LP-based semantics is used [24] . The advantage of the LP approach over the set approach is that it is easily extended to additional forms of policy statements.
Definition 3 (LP semantics for SDSI LP[P])
Given P, let LP[P] be the following set of Horn clauses:
In LP[P] we use one ternary predicate m; intuitively, m(K , A, K ) means that K is in the valuation of the local name K A.
The semantics of P is defined to be the least Herbrand model of
Example 3 Consider the set P of 4-tuples given in Example 1. The set of Horn clauses determined by P is as follows:
The LP semantics is equivalent to the set-theoretic semantics in the sense that
K . This is stated and proved in Proposition 2, after we have introduced the FOL semantics for SDSI, which gives an alternative way to define LP[P].
The alternate formulation illustrates more clearly the intuition underlying LP[P] and its relationship with the settheoretic semantics.
The LP semantics is an attractive logical semantics. It is natural in the sense that it directly captures the set-based semantics intuition. It can also be used for computation purposes. Observe that LP[P] is a Datalog program, that is, it does not have any function symbol other than constants. In addition, LP[P] can be transformed to an equivalent logic program with at most two variables per rule. For example, the clause "m(
Given a set P of 4-tuples with total size N , let L be the length of the longest extended name that appears in any 4-tuple in P, one can first transform LP[P] to contain only clauses that have at most two variables and then instantiate the clauses with principals in P, obtaining a ground program with size O(N 3 L). It has been shown that the least Herbrand model of a ground logic program can be computed in time linear in the size of the program [8] . Therefore, any Horn query against LP[P] can be answered in time O(N 3 L). This complexity is the same as the complexity bound derived in three papers [7, 16, 26] using algorithms based on string rewriting, graph searching, and pushdown systems.
A first-order logic semantics for SDSI

Definition 4 (FOL semantics for SDSI (Th[P])
We use a macro contains, which takes a name and a logical variable as parameters, and defines a first-order logic formula.
Given a set P of 4-tuples, we define Th[P] to be the following FOL theory:
Example 4 Consider the set P of 4-tuples given in Example 1. The FOL theory determined by P is as follows:
Proposition 2 (Equivalence of LP semantics and settheoretic semantics) Given a set P of 4-tuples, a name S and a principal K , LP[P] |= contains[S][K ] if and only if V[P](S) K . In particular, for any local name K A, LP[P] |= m(K , A, K ) if and only if V[P](K A) K .
Proof Given a set P of 4-tuples, consider the set G of all functions g : N L → ℘ (K) that satisfies the following two conditions: (1) We now show that for any function g ∈ G, name S, and
and only if contains[S][K ] is true in the interpretation π(g).
We use induction on the length of S. For the base case, we consider two subcases, |S| = 1 and |S| = 2.
The induction hypothesis clearly holds. When |S| = 2, i.e., S is a local name
, the induction hypothesis thus holds. For the induction step, S is an extended name
K holds if and only if there exists a principal
which, from the induction hypothesis, holds if and
which holds if and only if contains[S][K ] is true in π(g).
From the fact that we just proved, it follows that a function g satisfies "g(
and only if ∀z(contains[K A][z] ⇐ contains[S][z]) evaluates to true in π(g). Therefore, a function g satisfies SC[P], the systems of set inequalities induced by P, if and only if π(g) is a model of LP[P]. It follows from this fact that the least Herbrand model of LP[P] is π(M[P]), where M[P] is the least solution to SC[P]. P
The LP semantics has the same limitation as the settheoretic semantics, it cannot be used to directly determine whether S 1 rewrites into S 2 . Such a query corresponds to the FOL formula
Unless S 2 is a principal, such a formula is not a Horn query. For example, whether
The FOL semantics does not have this limitation. In the FOL semantics, each 4-tuple is translated into a FOL formula, each rewriting query is also translated into a FOL formula, and standard logical implication defines whether the query is an implication of the 4-tuples. For example, the two formulas given above are both logical implication of the theory Th[P] given in Example 4.
In the FOL semantics, other FOL formulae can also be used as meaningful queries. For example, the formula
) when used as a query means that if K 2 A 1 and K 2 A 2 share a common member, then K 1 A 1 and K 1 A 2 also share a common member.
Equivalence among SDSI's semantics
Proposition 2 says that the set-theoretic semantics is equivalent to the LP semantics for membership queries. The LP semantics can be viewed as a special case of the FOL semantics where only Horn queries are allowed. However, to the best of our knowledge, the relationship between the rewriting semantics and the other three semantics have not been established and proved in the literature before.
In this section, we prove the following equivalence between the rewriting semantics and the FOL semantics: given any set P of 4-tuples, RS[P] £ S 1 * S 2 if and only if
In addition, we establish a way to use logic programs to efficiently determine whether
, and prove that this approach is correct.
First, we prove a proposition that will be useful in proving the main theorem.
Proposition 3 Given a set P of policy statements, if
See the Appendix A for the proof. We need the following definition, which helps in transforming a query
) into a Horn query. This definition gives a canonical way for placing a principal K in the valuation of a name S.
Definition 5 Given a set P of 4-tuples, a name S
The objective for constructing add(P, S, K ) in this way is to make sure that for any name S , RS[P] £ S * S if and only if add(P, S, K ) £ S * K , assuming that K does not appear in P or S . We will need the following fact.
Fact 4 RS[add(P, K
Proof Given rewriting rules in add(P,
, and so on, and finally into K −1 A , and into K . P
We are now ready to state the main theorem of this section. 1 and S 2 , the following three statements are equivalent: 
Theorem 5 Given a set P of 4-tuples, and two names S
See the Appendix A for the proof. The equivalence of 2 and 3 in Theorem 5 says that to determine whether
, one can do the following: create a new principal K , find a local name K A not defined in P, construct P' by adding to P the 4-tuple K A → S 1 and additional 4-tuples to make sure that S 2 rewrites into K , then check whether
The proof of the equivalence of 2 and 3 in the Appendix A uses their relationships with the rewriting semantics. However, this equivalence also follows from general results in proof theory. Both Horn clauses and queries of the form ∀z(contains[
are in a subclass of Harrop Hereditary formulas for which classical provability, intuitionistic provability, and uniform provability are equivalent (Nadathur [29] ). Uniform proofs [28] are a restricted form of intuitionistic proofs that embody a special form of goal-directedness. Using uniform proofs, in order to determine whether
This is essentially what we are doing in Definition 5 and Theorem 5. The equivalence of classical provability and uniform provability for this class of queries implies that this proof method is sound and complete with respect to classical FOL. The equivalence of classical provability and intuitionistic provability for this class of queries also implies that one can also view the semantics as defined in intuitionistic logic rather than classical logic.
Comparisons of the four semantics
The 4-tuple reduction rule gives an operational string rewriting semantics for SDSI, while the set-theoretic semantics defines a valuation for every name, given a set P of 4-tuples. The following corollary summarizes the relationships between the rewriting semantics and the set-theoretic semantics.
Corollary 6
Given any set P of 4-tuples, principal K , and names S 1 , S 2 , the following three properties hold. 
RS[P] £ S * K if and only if V[P](S) K . 3. When S 2 is not a principal, V[P](S 1 ) ⊇ V[P](S
however, using P, one cannot rewrite K A 1 into K A 2 . P Proposition 2 shows that the LP semantics is equivalent to the set-theoretic semantics. By definition, the LP semantics is a special case of the FOL semantics. Theorem 5 shows that the rewriting semantics is equivalent to the FOL semantics, for any query expressed using rewriting relationship between two names. However, other meaningful queries can be defined using the FOL semantics. Therefore, in terms of the class of queries can be answered, the set-theoretic semantics = the LP semantics < the string rewriting semantics < the FOL semantics.
Related work on semantics for SDSI and comparison
Abadi [1] initiated the study of logical semantics for SDSI. Halpern and van der Meyden [11] followed the same path and proposed the Logic of Local Name Containment (LLNC), which refined Abadi's logic. Both logics are propositional modal logics, where a proposition has the form of one name rewriting into another name. The focus of their study is to get a set of axioms characterizing their logic. Halpern and van der Meyden uses the set-theoretic semantics of SDSI as the semantics of their logic and came up with a set of axioms that are sound and complete with respect to the semantics. SDSI 1.1 [30] (the version of SDSI before merging with SPKI) gives pseudo-code of a nondeterministic algorithm for resolving a name into a principal given a set of 4-tuples. Like the set-theoretic semantics, this algorithmic semantics defines a mapping from names to sets of principals. This semantics was used as the reference semantics in the logics by Abadi [1] and by Halpern and van der Meyden [11] .
Li [20] showed that the algorithmic semantics in [30] is equivalent to the string rewriting semantics for queries about the mapping from names to principals. Li [20] also gave another LP-based semantics for SDSI, which translates a set of SDSI 4-tuples into a logic program. The logic program in [20] uses list constructs used in Prolog. It answers only queries about the mapping from names to principals. Furthermore, it is not as natural as the LP semantics in Definition 3, and is not as easy to extend to FOL.
Clarke et al. [7] explicitly describe 4-tuple reduction as string rewriting and devise string rewriting algorithms for determining whether it is possible to rewrite a name into a principal. Their algorithm does not work for determining whether one name rewrites into another.
The class of string rewriting systems generated by sets of 4-tuples have the following characteristics: when rewriting a name, the rewriting replaces the first two symbols, which form a local name, with another name, and the result is also a name. Jha and Reps [16] pointed out that SDSI string rewriting systems correspond exactly to the class of string rewriting systems modelled using push-down systems. This connection reduces certain computation problems in SDSI to reachability analysis and model checking in push-down systems, for which efficient algorithms exist.
Comparing with these previous proposed semantics for SDSI, the FOL semantics proposed in this paper has the following advantages:
-The FOL semantics is very natural. It directly captures the set-based semantics of SDSI, which is widely used as the underlying semantic intuition for SDSI, e.g., both by SDSI designers in [7] and by Halpern and van der Meyden [11] . In addition, it uses classical FOL, instead of more complex logics with modal operators. -It contains more information in the sense that a larger class of meaningful queries can be formulated and defined in this semantics. Queries other than those asking whether it is possible to rewrite one name into another can be formulated and answered in this semantics. -The FOL semantics is easily extended to support useful extensions of SDSI. In this paper we will show how to naturally extend the FOL semantics to deal with SPKI. Other important ways of extending the SDSI 4-tuples are also handled straightforwardly. One extension to SDSI is to add an intersection operator, e.g.,
The meaning of such a statement is immediate given the set-based semantic intuition. Supporting intersection in the FOL semantics is straightforwardly done using the logical conjunction operator. Another extension to SDSI is to allow identifiers to be logical terms, e.g., K student(univ='Stanford') → K John Smith . In FOL semantics, this can be supported either by making the predicate m take more parameters or by having a predicate for each identifier function symbol, e.g., using "student" as a predicate symbol. Extending logics such as LLNC to support these extensions may be possible, but seems less obvious. -The FOL semantics has computational significance. Theorem 5 gives an efficient (in time polynomial in the size of P) way to check whether RS[P] £ S 1 * S 2 for any names S 1 and S 2 . In LLNC, although a complete axiom system was given, the complexity of using the axiom system to determine whether RS[P] £ S 1 * S 2 is not clear and seems unlikely to be efficient.
Because of this, we believe that the FOL semantics should be viewed as the reference semantics. Any semantics for SDSI should be equivalent to the FOL semantics for the class of queries it handles. Some other semantics are useful for computational or understanding purposes, of course. For example, the string rewriting semantics is both helpful for understanding SDSI and for computation, because of its relationship with push-down systems.
RT C
: A trust-management language extending SDSI
Since SDSI was originally designed for distributed naming, SDSI lacks some features that are useful for TM language. The RT family of Role-based Trust-management languages [24, 26] extends SDSI in several ways. Two new features associated with RT C 1 [22] , the RT language most relevant to our discussion of SPKI/SDSI, are intersection and structured identifiers. With intersection, we can define a local name to contain the intersection of two or more names. Many natural security policy statements have the form that a principal has a certain permission (or an attribute) if it has two (or more) other attributes. With structured identifiers, we can define a group K student(dept = 'CS', program ='PhD', year ='2002', name ='John Smith', . . .), which contains students with the specified department, program, year, and name. In addition to straightforward rules such as "K student(dept = 'CS', program = 'PhD', year = '2002', name = 'John Smith', . . .) → K John Smith ", specific values can be replaced by variables, allowing selection of subsets of the group. For example, "K perm → K student(dept = 'CS')" grants permission "perm" to all principals that are CS students. Internal structure in identifiers also enables us to represent relationships among principals. For example, using local names such as "K managerOf(Alice)" and "K 1 physicianOf(Bob)", a principal can issue statements such as "K accessRecord(?X) → K 1 physicianOf(?X)". This states that the physician of any patient can access the record for that patient. ("?X" represents a logical variable.) Structured identifiers can also be used to represent access permissions with parameters that identify resources and access modes.
SPKI/SDSI, which is intended to be a full-fledged TM language, can be viewed as the result of adding SDSI features to SPKI, allowing names to be used in subjects of auth certs. In Sect. 4, we will analyze SPKI/SDSI and argue that the design of SPKI/SDSI is problematic in several ways. In particular, authorization tags, which are used to qualify permissions in SPKI/SDSI, are quirky and algorithmically problematic. To make our analysis easier to follow, we first look at RT C 1 [22] in this section and later compare the two extensions of SDSI. As pointed out in [24, 26] , the design of RT is heavily influenced by SDSI and Delegation Logic [21] . RT 0 , the most basic language in the RT family, can be viewed as adding intersections to SDSI. RT 1 adds to RT 0 parameters (i.e., structured identifiers). RT C 1 further extends RT 1 with constraints. The semantics of the RT languages are based on translating statements into logical sentences, in the same style as SDSI's FOL-based semantics.
Syntax of policy statements in RT C
1
Before describing the syntax of policy statements in RT C 1 , we first explain the terminological differences between SDSI and RT . Identifiers in SDSI are called role terms in RT , and local names in SDSI are called roles. We use R, often with subscripts, to denote role terms, and we add a dot between a principal and a role term. For example, K .R represents a role in RT ; it corresponds to the local name K R in SDSI. Policy statements in RT 0 , RT 1 , and RT C 1 have the same structures. They only differ in how role terms are formed. In the following statements, the directions of the arrows are the opposite of that used in SDSI rewriting rules. We use this direction because it is the same as the direction of logical implication in the logic-based semantics.
A type-3 statement requires the same K to be used in both the role being defined, K .R, and the definition K .R 1 .R 2 . This design is motivated by the need to handle deduction with policy statements that are stored in a distributed manner [26] . Observe that 4-tuples that use long extended names can still be equivalently represented in RT , by introducing new role terms and statements. For more details on this, see [26] .
In RT 0 , a role term is simply a role name, which is just like an identifier in SDSI. Thus, RT 0 is essentially SDSI extended with the intersection operation (in type-4 statements). In RT 1 , a role term may also contain parameters. These parameters may be constants or variables, and may use constraints in some limited ways. RT C 1 allows more general forms of role terms, which we now describe. In RT C 1 , each role term takes the form of r (h 1 , . . . , h n ), in which r is a role name, and for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, h i takes one of the following three forms: p = c, p ∈ S, and p = ref , in which p is the name of one of r 's parameters that has type τ , c is a constant of type τ , S is a value set of type τ , and ref is a reference to another parameter in the same statement, also of type τ . RT C 1 does not have explicit appearance of logical variables; instead, different parameters may be specified to be equal. Intuitively, a value set is a constraintbased representation of a set of values, e.g., [10. .800] may be a value set of an integer type. Parameters in role terms are specified by name, rather than by position; and they are strongly typed. For example, the following RT C 1 statement "K SA .socketPerm(host ∈ descendants('stanford.edu'), port∈ [8000..8443])←−K Alice " means that K SA grants to K Alice the permission to connect to any host in the domain 'stanford.edu' at any port between 8000 and 8443.
Semantics of RT C
1
Without constraints, policy statements in RT C 1 are translated into Datalog clauses (which can be viewed as first-order sentences), in ways very similar to SDSI. RT C 1 statements with constraints are translated into clauses in multi-sorted Constraint Datalog; these clauses can also be viewed as firstorder sentences. In the following, we give an brief overview of Constraint Datalog. See [22] for more details of Constraint Datalog and for the translation from RT C 1 statements to clauses in Constraint Datalog.
Constraint Datalog (denoted by DATALOG C ) is a restricted form of Constraint Logic Programming (CLP) [15] , and is also a class of query languages for Constraint Databases (CDB) [17, 18] . The notion of constraint databases, which was introduced by Kanellakis et al. [17] , grew out of the research on Datalog and CLP and generalizes the relational model of data by allowing infinite relations that are finitely representable using constraints. DATALOG C allows first-order formula in one or more constraint domains, which may describe file hierarchies, time intervals, and so on, to be used in the body of a clause. Intuitively, a constraint domain is a domain of objects, such as numbers, points in a plane, or files in a file hierarchy, together with a language for speaking about these objects. A constraint domain has a first-order language defined by a set of constants, function symbols, and relation symbols, and a class of quantifier-free formula in the langauge, called primitive constraints. The following are some example constraint domains that are used when translating RT C 1 into DATALOG C . Tree domains Each constant of a tree domain takes the form a 1 , . . . , a k . Imagine a tree in which every node is labelled with a string value and nodes that have a common parent are labelled with distinct strings. The constant a 1 , . . . , a k represents the node for which a 1 , . . . , a k are the strings on the path from root to this node. A primitive constraint is of the form x = y or xθ a 1 , . . . , a k , in which θ ∈ {=, <, ≤, ≺, }. The constraint x < a 1 , . . . , a k means that x is a child of the node a 1 , . . . , a k , and x ≺ a 1 , . . . , a k means that x is a descendant of a 1 , . . . , a k . Range domains The set of all constants in a range domain is linearly ordered. A primitive constraint has the form x = y, x = c or x ∈ (c 1 , c 2 ), in which c is a constant, each of c 1 and c 2 is either a constant or a special symbol " * ", meaning unbounded. The constraint x ∈ (c 1 , c 2 ), when both c 1 and c 2 are constants, means that c 1 < x ∧x < c 2 .
When c 1 is not * , "(" can also be "["; similarly, ")" can be "]" when c 2 is not * . Discrete domains with sets A primitive constraint has the form x ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c }, in which c 1 , . . . , c are constants.
We say that these constraint domains are unary because each primitive constraint either has the form x = y, where x and y are variables, or contains only one variable. We call a primitive constraint that contains just one variable a basic constraint. The three classes of unary constraint domains described earlier support the following three operations.
Conjunction Given two basic constraints φ 1 (x) and φ 2 (x), determine whether φ 1 (x) ∧ φ 2 (x) is satisfiable, and if it is, compute
is a basic constraint, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and the disjunction is logically equivalent to φ 1 (x) ∧ φ 2 (x). Constraint Projection Given any basic constraint, determine whether it is satisfiable. Constraint Subsumption Given the disjunction of a set of basic constraints, determine whether another basic constraint is implied by the disjunction, e.g., determine whether x ∈ [2, 8] is implied by the disjunction of x ∈ [1, 5] and x ∈ [3, 10].
These operations make it possible to evaluate DATALOG C programs using constraints in these domains. Li and Mitchell [22] have shown that tree domains, range domains, and discrete domains with sets have additional properties that make such evaluation efficient.
Types
Role terms in RT C 1 are strongly typed. One declares what parameters a role takes and the names and data types of these parameters. One also declares new data types using the mechanisms provided by the RT framework [24] . Role parameters and data types are declared in application domain specification documents (ADSDs). Each ADSD is globally uniquely identified. One way to uniquely identify an ADSD is to use a collision-free hash of the document as the identifier; one may also include in the identifier an URI pointing to the document so that it can be easily retrieved. An ADSD declares a suite of related data types and role names, called a vocabulary. Policy statements, when using a role name, refer to the ADSD in which the role name is declared. This enables RT to have strongly typed policy statements. ADSDs also provide solutions to the following vocabulary agreement problem. For a statement K .student ←− K .university.student to make sense; every principal K that is a member of the role K .university must agree with K on what "student" means, e.g., whether it is a student registered in any class, or a student enrolled in a degree program. The use of ADSDs ensure that everyone is talking about the student role declared in one specific ADSD. The use of ADSDs and strongly typed statements helps reduce the possibility of errors in writing policy statements and unintended interaction among policy statements.
The notion of vocabularies is complementary to the notion of localized name spaces for roles. Each addresses a distinct name space issue. For example, an accrediting board might issue an ADSD that declares the role name "student". This defines the names and data types of the role's parameters. Such parameters may include university name, student name, program enrolled in, and so on. The ADSD may also contain description of the conditions under which a principal should be made a member of the student role, e.g., it may require a principal be registered in a degree program. Then a university StateU that has the public key K StateU can use this ADSD to issue credentials defining K StateU .student. Although using a vocabulary created by another principal, StateU is still the authority over who is a member of the role K StateU .student.
RT C 1 has several categories of types: integer types, float types, enumeration types, string types, tree types. Some system-defined data types of these categories exist, and one can declare new data types of these categories. Each type category has a syntax for defining value sets. Unordered enumeration types and string types correspond to discrete domains with sets; a value set takes the form of a set of constants. Integer types, float types, and ordered enumeration types correspond to range domains; a value set takes the form of a range, e.g., [10, 200] , or (10, * ). Tree types correspond to tree domains; and are used to represent hierarchical structured resources such as file hierarchies and DNS names; a value set takes the form of a predefined function symbol applied to a node, e.g., descendants( edu, stanford ) and currentAndChildren( edu, stanford, cs ).
Analyzing SPKI/SDSI using first-order-logic
In this section, we extend the FOL semantics for SDSI to SPKI/SDSI, which has authorization certificates (or auth certs) and ACL entries, in addition to name certs. Both auth certs and ACL entries are 5-tuples. An auth cert is a signed five tuple (K , H, D, T, V ) , where -K ∈ K is the issuer principal, which signs the cert. The issuer grants a specific authorization through this 5-tuple. -H ∈ H is called the subject, where H is defined to be the least set satisfying the following two conditions: (1) S ⊆ H, where S is the set of all names, and (2)
where θ is a keyword, k and n are integers such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H n ∈ H. The subject specifies principals that receive authorization from this 5-tuple. -D ∈ {0, 1} is called the delegation bit. When D = 1, the subject may further delegate the authorization it receives from this 5-tuple. -T is the authorization tag, each tag represents a (potentially infinite set of) byte strings. T specifies the authorization that is granted by this 5-tuple. -V is the validity specification, which is the same as in the case of a name cert.
An ACL entry is a locally stored 5-tuple (Self, H, D, T, V ) . It is very similar to an auth cert, except that the issuer is a special symbol Self instead of a key and that the ACL entry is not signed. We will treat Self as a special principal in K.
Roughly speaking, a 5-tuple (K , H, D, T, V ) means that the principal K delegates the authorization encoded in T to every principal that is associated with H , and when D = 1, allows such a principal to further delegate this authorization.
The 5-tuple reduction rule in Sect. 6.3 of RFC 2693 is as follows: the two 5-tuples
VIntersect is an operator that takes two validity specifications V 1 and V 2 and returns a validity specification that is valid only when both V 1 and V 2 are valid. AIntersect is an operator that takes two authorization tags T 1 and T 2 , and returns their intersection; AIntersect(T 1 , T 2 ) may fail when the intersection of T 1 and T 2 is empty.
Observe that the 5-tuple reduction rule only applies when the subject is a principal. When the subject is a name, the way to use the 5-tuple reduction rule is to first replace a 5-tuple that has a name S as the subject with a set of 5-tuples, each of which has one principal in the valuation of the S as the subject. The procedure for handling thresholds is much more complicated; it is described in details in Clarke et al. [7] .
Handling basic delegation relationships in 5-tuples
To understand 5-tuples, we first make some simplifying assumptions. These assumptions will be removed later one by one.
1. We assume that the authority tag T does not have any internal structure, and can be viewed as an identifier. As a result, AIntersect(T 1 , T 2 ) either fails (when T 1 = T 2 ) or returns T 1 (when T 1 = T 2 ). 2. We ignore the validity specification V , and write (K , S, T, D, ·) for a 5-tuple. We assume that only currently valid certificates are considered. 3. We assume that the subject does not contain thresholds; in other words, the subject is a name S.
When D = 0, a 5-tuple (K , S, 0, T, ·) simply means that K grants the authorization T to any principal who is in the valuation of S. If we allow identifiers that correspond to authorization tags to be used in 4-tuples, we can use K T to denote the set of all principals that K grants the authorization T to, and view this 5-tuple as a 4-tuple K T → S.
When D = 1, a 5-tuple (K , S, 1, T, ·) means that K grants the authorization to any principal that is in the valuation of S and to any principal such a principal further grants T to. In other words, (K , S, 1, T, ·) can be represented using two 4-tuples K T → S and K T → S T . For example, a 5-tuple (K ,
Using 5-tuple reduction, one can use
. This can be viewed as deriving new rewriting rules from existing ones:
This equivalence relationship between 5-tuples and 4-tuples is formally stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 7 Given a set P of valid 4-tuples and 5-tuples, assume that no threshold is used in
See the Appendix A.3 for the proof. The earlier proposition shows that under the simplifying assumptions stated in the beginning of this section, 5-tuples can be viewed as 4-tuples, and we can use the FOL semantics for SDSI to provide a semantics for the simplified version of SPKI. In particular, if one asks whether (K , K , D, T, ·) can be obtained from P using 4-tuple and 5-tuple reductions, then this can be answered using by viewing P as a rewriting system. Note that it is possible to have
In this sense, the 5-tuple reduction rule is incomplete with respect to the string rewriting semantics. This incompleteness has been observed by Halpern and van der Meyden [12] . One can argue that as one may be only interested in queries about whether to grant access to a particular principal, in which case the queries will be 5-tuples that use principals as subjects. For these queries, the reduction procedures are complete, under the simplifying assumptions.
In the version of SPKI that existed before merging with SDSI, the subject of a, 5-tuple cannot contain names. In this case a 5-tuple (K , K 1 , 1, T, V ) can be represented using two 4-tuples K T → K 1 and K T → K 1 T . This represents very limited delegation relationships. One cannot express K T 1 → K T 2 , which means that K grants the authorization T 1 to any principal that has the authorization T 2 . Neither can one express the tuple K T → K T 1 T , which represents a delegation about T from K to members of K T 1 .
Using constraints to handle authorization tags and validity specifications
Having understood the delegation semantics of SPKI, we remove the first simplifying assumption and deal with authorization tags. Howell ([13] Chap. 6) provided a detailed analysis of authorization tags in his PhD thesis. In this analysis, an authorization tag T is viewed as representing an (often infinite) set of strings. Here, we take the same view and use constraints to specify the authorization represented as a tag. We use a unary constraint domain in which a basic constraint has the form t ∈ T , where t is a logical variable and T is an authorization tag. The mapping from tags to sets of strings then determines the truthfulness of formulas in this constraint domain. We will look at details of tags and this constraint domain in Sect. 4.3.
Definition 6
Given a set P of 4-tuples and 5-tuples, we define Th[P] to be the following Constraint Datalog program (which is also a first-order theory). In addition to the predicate m used for 4-tuples, we also use another ternary predi-
RFC 2693 does not explicitly specify the class of queries in SPKI. However, because the 5-tuple reduction rule deduces new 5-tuples from existing ones, SPKI determines whether a 5-tuple follows from a set of statements. This is a reasonable class of queries to consider because authorization requests are also represented as 5-tuples. Because 5-tuples are represented using first-order formulas in our semantics, first-order logic naturally defines a semantic relation. Given a set P of 5-tuples and 4-tuples, if one wants to know whether a 5-tuple (K , S, 0, T, V ) follows from P, one can ask whether
If one wants to know whether a 5-tuple (K , S, 1, T, V ) follows from P, one should also check whether
is sound, i.e., when the for-
is a tautology for any pair of tags T 1 and T 2 , the 5-tuple reduction rule is sound with respect to the logical semantic relation. For example, the 5-tuple reduction that uses (
Validity specifications can be handled by extending the two ternary predicates m and g to take an additional parameter v, which denotes the time during which this tuple is valid and viewing validity specifications as constraints on v. For example, validity specifications that are validity periods are straightforwardly represented using range constraints.
Structure of tags
In this section, we look at the internal structure of tags. The main point of this section is that SPKI's 5-tuple reduction is an incomplete proof procedure with respect to the FOL semantics of SPKI. In addition, as pointed out before by Howell [13] , authorization tags are not well behaved. Specifically, the constraint domain for tags does not support operations that we need to compute the meaning of Th [P] .
The following descriptions of authorization tags follow RFC 2693. An authorization tag is a list of byte-strings or sub-lists. Two tags intersect by matching, element for element. If one list is longer than the other but matches at all elements where both lists have elements, then the longer list is the result of the intersection. This means that additional elements of a list must restrict the permission granted. For example, (ftp (host ftp.clark.net)) may represent the permission of ftp access to every file and every directory on the host ftp.clarke.net. This is more general than (ftp (host ftp.clark.net) (dir /pub/cme)), and the intersection of the two tags results in the latter. SPKI also has a small number of special expressions.
(*) stands for the set of all tags and byte-strings. In other words, it will match anything. When intersected with another tag, the result is that other tag. (*set <tag-expr>*) stands for the set of elements listed in the *-form. (*prefix <byte-string>) stands for the set of all byte strings that start with the one given in the *-form. (*range <ordering><lower-limit <upper->? limit>?) stands for the set of all byte strings lexically (or numerically) between the two limits. The ordering parameter (alpha, numeric, time, binary, date) specifies ordering.
We now show that 5-tuple reduction is incomplete with respect to the logical semantics, when interpreting tags as representing a set of strings. For example, given two 5-tuples (K , K 1 , 0, (*range numeric 1.0 1.9), V ) and (K , K 1 , 0, (* range 1.5 2.4), V ), then the query (K , K 1 , 0, (* range numeric 1.2 2.2), V ) should be true from the logic semantics; but it cannot be inferred from the two 5-tuples by reduction. Intuitively, one should be able to combine authorizations received from multiple 5-tuples. However, the reduction rule uses only tag intersection and does not consider tag union.
From this observation and the discussion in Sect. 4.2, we see that the proof procedure of using 4-tuple and 5-tuple reductions is a sound but incomplete procedure with respect to the FOL semantics, when tags are viewed as representation of sets of strings and AIntersect(T 1 , T 2 ) is sound. The proof procedure using reduction rules is incomplete even when we limit the queries to 5-tuples that have only principals as subjects. This incompleteness has not been observed in the literature, and is a direct result of our approach to use constraint domains to provide a FOL semantics for SPKI/SDSI.
A natural question to ask is whether there exists a sound and complete proof procedure for determining whether one 5-tuple follows from a set of 5-tuples. To do this, we have to look at the internal structures of tags and the operations on them. The short answer is that the constraint domain for representing tags is ill-behaved, and normal Constraint Datalog evaluation procedure does not apply. Howell [13] pointed out that intersections between some tags result in sets that may not be finitely represented using tags. This happens when intersecting a (* prefix) expression and a (* range) expression, or intersecting two two (* range) expressions that use different ordering. For example, consider the intersection of (tag (* range numeric ge 0.4 le 0.5)) and (tag (* prefix 4)). The byte-string "4.1e-1" is in the intersection; and the byte-strings "0.45" and "40.1" are not in the intersection. The intersection of the two tags consists of infinite number of tags and cannot be represented using a range tag or a prefix tag. Howell suggested artificially defining intersections in these potentially problematic cases to be empty, for lack of better solutions. This suggests that the constraint domain for authorization tags does not support the conjunction operation. It is also unclear how it can support the subsumption operation.
Authorization tags in SPKI vs. named and typed parameters in RT C
1
We have seen that, by viewing tags as representing sets of strings and viewing 4-tuples and 5-tuples as logical sentences, 5-tuple reduction is incomplete, and it seems unlikely that a complete proof procedure exists. This is clearly unsatisfactory. We now look for ways to remedy this problem.
SPKI/SDSI defines tags and their intersection in a syntactical way. Howell [13] provided a semantics for tags by viewing them as representations of sets of strings and found that "special tags cause havoc" (6.5.3 of [13] ). We feel that the string semantics for tags is still syntactical in that it does not consider what the strings intend to represent. The (* prefix) tag, for example, is used for representing treelike file hierarchies. If we consider the motivation and application for this construct, it seems more natural to represent statements about file hierarchies using multi-sorted FOL with a special sort devoted to files and directories. This approach leads to a constraint domain for tree-like hierarchies, namely, a tree domain, which we discussed in Sect. 3.2. The move to constraints over tree domains not only gives us a natural semantics, but leads to more expressive policy options. For example, (* prefix) is not helpful for referring to the DNS hierarchy in an access policy; we need a (* postfix) tag instead. Nor can one use (* prefix) to represent the set of all files and directories that are direct children of a directory, where as tree domains support these constraints. Similarly, (* range) tags are more naturally viewed as a form of constraints over range domains than sets of strings.
We believe that instead of viewing tags as defining sets of strings, and allowing combinations of string operations that do not meaningfully refer to any controlled resources, it is more informative and semantically appealing to use one special purpose constraint domain for each concept. The language RT C 1 does exactly this, allowing many choices of constraint domains. For example, in RT C 1 , one can declare one tree domain for file hierarchies, another tree domain for DNS names, one range domain for time of the day, and another range domain for port numbers, and so on. Each constraint domain has its standard semantic meaning, given by a first-order structure, and is easy to understand and handle algorithmically. In RT C 1 , a role term may have multiple named and typed parameters, each parameter from one constraint domain. This syntactic requirement allows different constraint domains to be combined in a single policy, without introducing meaningless statements that, for example, apply range predicates to tree expressions. A statement in RT C 1 can be translated into a Constraint Datalog clause with constraints from tree domains, range domains, or discrete domains with sets. In [22] , we have proved that these domains are tractable and that evaluating the minimal models of Datalog programs with any multi-sorted combination of tractable domains remains tractable.
While we believe the multi-sorted language with multiple constraint domains is more appealing, there are combinations of SPKI/SDSI tags that cannot be translated into RT C 1 in any straightforward way. While many of these combinations do not seem meaningful or desirable, there are some aspects of SPKI/SDSI tag intersection that do seem useful and are not easily expressed in RT C 1 without special provision. The SPKI/SDSI AIntersect operator treats a longer tag as a more specialized tag. The design rationale for this to enable one to further specialize an authorization tag by appending new fields at the end. This flexibility seems to be missing in the strongly typed approach. The designers of the initial tags may not be able to foresee all necessary parameters; therefore, the initial type specification may not have all the parameters one wants. In RT C 1 , this flexibility is brought back by a feature that we call restrictive inheritance. A role name can be declared to restrictively inherit another role name and adds more parameters. Statements about the original role also implies statements about the extended role. For more details on this, see [23] .
4.5 Threshold subjects in SPKI vs. the intersection operator in RT C 1 SPKI/SDSI lacks support for conjunction. As a result, it is not possible to directly grant a permission to any principal who has two or more attributes at the same time. Another use of conjunction is to allow a principal to manage a permission (by further delegating to other principals) without being able to use the permission. In RT C 1 , which has an intersection operator providing logical conjunction, K .perm ← K 1 .perm ∩ K .student can be read as saying that K allows K 1 to delegate the authorization perm, but only to members of K .student. If K 1 is not a member of K .student, then K 1 cannot make itself a member of K .perm, even if it issues K 1 .perm ← K 1 .
Threshold subjects are part of SPKI/SDSI. If threshold subjects, which SPKI/SDSI allows only in 5-tuples, are also allowed in 4-tuples, they can be used to implement conjunction. For example, θ(2,
Threshold subjects in 4-tuples are allowed in [10] and earlier versions of [9] , but are not allowed in [7, 9] , because they are viewed as "too convoluted to be useful in practice" [7] . As observed by Li [20] , the meaning of threshold subjects in 5-tuples is different from that in 4-tuples. We illustrate their differences through the following example.
Example 5 Consider the following set of 4-tuples and 5-tuples.
Now consider the following set of 4-tuples and 5-tuples, in which we use thresholds in 4-tuples.
means that the valuation of K A includes any principal that is in the valuation of θ(2,
, which includes any principal who is in the valuation of both K 1 A 1 and
In summary, if a threshold subject is used in a 4-tuple, then k of the n subjects in a threshold subject must be resolved to a single principal. In a 5-tuple, k subjects can be resolved to different principals, which can further delegate to a single principal.
Coming up with a declarative semantics for threshold subjects in 5-tuples is not an easy task. Clarke et al. ( [7] , Section 10) uses a highly operational approach to handle thresholds. Halpern and van der Meyden [12] avoids threshold subjects in their logical reconstruction of SPKI. Intuitively, with threshold subjects, it is not a single principal that has some attributes (e.g., being granted an authorization); instead, a set of principals together have some attributes. This set of principals can all delegate to one principal; they can also submit a joint access request.
In order to provide a logical approach to threshold subjects, the RT framework has the RT T component, which handles threshold using manifold roles. Manifold roles generalize normal roles to allow each member to be a set of principals rather than a single principal. RT T supports more expressive threshold structures and separation-of-duties policies, and has a logical semantics. See [24] for details on RT T . An example policy that one can easily express in RT T is requiring two different cashiers together to complete a transaction. To express this in SPKI, one has to explicitly list all the cashier principals in the threshold subject, and so the policy statement needs to be changed each time a new cashier is added or removed. Note that delegating to θ(2, [K cashier, K cashier]) is incorrect, since one single cashier principal satisfies the threshold in SPKI's semantics.
Related work and comparison
Several authors have attempted to provide a formal semantics for SPKI. Aura [3] introduced a graphical representation for 5-tuples, called delegation networks; however, it does not handle SDSI names. Howell and Kotz [14] developed a logic that extends the ABLP logic [2, 19] with a restricted form of delegation and provides a semantics for SPKI/SDSI authorization. In [12] Halpern and van der Meyden extended their Logic of Local Name Containment (LLNC) [11] to deal with 5-tuples in SPKI. These logics use specialized propositional modal logics, which are more complicated than the standard FOL used here.
Howell [13] provided a detailed study of authorization tags in SPKI and pointed out that special tags in SPKI cause semantical problems. Bandmann and Dam [4] pointed out another problem with authorization tags: computing AIntersect of two tags that use (* set) may take time exponential in the size of the two tags.
The incompleteness problem of the SPKI 5-tuplereduction rule we identified here was not discussed in literature.
Conclusion
SPKI/SDSI is a language for expressing distributed access control policy, derived from SPKI and SDSI. Significant effort has gone into finding a logic-based semantics for both SDSI naming alone and SPKI/SDSI. We presented a FOL semantics for SDSI based on translating each name cert into a Datalog clause, viewed as a FOL sentence. We also proved that the FOL semantics is equivalent to the string rewriting semantics used by SDSI designers, for all queries associated with the rewriting semantics. The advantages of our approach over previous logics are the following. First-order logic captures the set-based semantic intuition of SDSI, and requires only classical first-order logic rather than more complex modal logics. The FOL semantics contains more information than rewriting semantics in the sense that a larger class of queries can be formulated and understood. This opens the door to more possibilities of safety and availability analysis, along the lines developed in [25] . The FOL semantics is easily extended to support useful extensions to SDSI and, finally, the relationship between the FOL semantics and logic programming provides an efficient method to answer a large class of queries.
In our study of full SPKI/SDSI, we use as comparison a trust management language RT C 1 [22] , which has Constraint Datalog as its semantic foundation. RT C 1 is a language in the RT family of Role-based Trust-management languages [24, 26] , and can be viewed as extending SDSI by adding several features. By adopting specific constraint domains tailored to SPKI/SDSI, we provided a FOL semantics for SPKI/SDSI in which authorization tags and validity specification are interpreted as logical constraints. This interpretation of SPKI/SDSI helped us examine several design issues, using RT C 1 for comparison. Our analysis shows that SPKI's 5-tuple reduction procedure is semantically incomplete. One reason is that reduction does not handle union of tags. In addition, authorization tags in SPKI/SDSI are algorithmically problematic, making a complete proof procedure unlikely. The constraint feature of RT C 1 provides an alternative mechanism that is often more expressive than SPKI/SDSI tags, semantically natural, and algorithmically tractable. The translation of SPKI/SDSI into logic with constraints, and experience with RT C 1 , suggests that Constraint Datalog is an appropriate foundation for trust management languages, subsuming SPKI/SDSI and possessing several algorithmic and expressiveness advantages.
We prove this proposition by using induction on i to show that A 1 , y 1 ),  m(y 1 , A 2 , y 2 ), . . . , m(y −1 , A , z) is in LP[P], > 1, and
, and so on, and finally into K .
A.2 Proof for Theorem 5
Theorem 5 is stated as follows: Given a set P of 4-tuples, and two names S 1 and S 2 , the following three statements are equivalent.
where K A is any local name not defined in P, and P and K depend on the form of S 2 : -when S 2 is a principal, K = S 2 and P = P ∪ {K A → S 1 } -when S 2 = K 1 A 1 · · · A where ≥ 1, we set K to be a principal not appearing in P and P = add(P, S 2 , K ) ∪ {K A → S 1 }.
Proof 1 implies 2:
We use induction on the number of rewriting steps. For the basis, S 1 = S 2 , the formula ∀z( S . S 1 is either a principal, a local name, or an extended name. S 1 cannot be a principal, since then the rewriting from S 1 to S is impossible. If S 1 is a local name, then S 1 → S ∈ P, and so ∀z(contains[ (K 1 , B 1 , y 1 ), m(y 1 , B 2 , y 2 ), m(y k−1 , B k , y k ), m(y k , A 2 , y 2 ) Consider the rewriting sequence from K A to K . In the last step, the rule applied has to be K −1 A → K , since that is the only rule having a K on its right hand side. The rule applied in the second to last step has to be K −2 A −1 → K −1 , since that is the only rule having K −1 to appear on its right-hand side, and so on. Therefore, the rewriting sequence from K A to K must contain an S 2 . Now consider the the first rule applied in the sequence; it has to be K A → S 1 , since it is the only rule that can be applied. (Recall that by definition K A is not defined in P.) Therefore, the rewriting sequence must contains in its middle a sequence rewriting from S 1 to S 2 . Further observe that the rules in P but not in P cannot be applied in this middle sequence. Therefore, then one gets a name S 1 , from where one cannot get K 1 T (which is not a name, as it involves an authorization tag), as one can apply only rules derived from 4-tuples to a name and the result is always a name in any future rewriting. Therefore, the first step in the rewriting from K T to K 1 T uses the rewriting rule K T → S 1 T , derived from a 5-tuple (K , S 1 , 1, T, ·) in P, and gives us S 1 T . The rest of the sequence must first rewrite S 1 to a principal using 4-tuples. As the sequence does not contain any string having the form of a principal followed by T , this principal must be K 1 . Therefore, using 4-tuple reductions, one can reduce S 1 to K . Therefore, one can derive the 5-tuple (K , K 1 , 1, T, ·) from. P Proof for 3: If RS[P] £ K T * K T , consider the sequence of strings from K T and K T , let n denote the number of these strings having the form of a principal followed by T . Clearly n ≥ 2, we use induction on n. For the base case, n = 2. It follows from the lemma we proved above that P (K , K , 1, T, ·) . For the step, consider the sequence of strings from K T and K T , let K 1 T be the first name in the sequence having the form of a principal followed by T . Then from induction hypothesis, the 5-tuple P (K 1 , K , 1, T, ·) .
From the lemma, P (K , K 1 , 1, T, ·); by 5-tuple reduction, P (K , K , 1, T, ·).
Proof for 4: If RS[P]£ K T * K , consider the sequence of strings from K T and K , let n denote the number of these strings having the form of a principal followed by T . Clearly n ≥ 1, we use induction on n. For the base case, n = 1, either K T is rewritten into K directly, in which case the 5-tuple (K , K , 0, T, ·) is in P, or K T S 1 * K for some name S 1 such that |S 1 | ≥ 1. Then (K , S 1 , 0, T, ·) ∈ P. As S 1 is a name, one can only apply (rewriting rules derived from) 4-tuples to it. By the assumption that n = 1, the rewriting from S 1 T to K T must be one that uses 4-tuples to rewrite S 1 into K . Therefore, using 4-tuple reduction one can reduce S 1 to K . Therefore, one can obtain the 5-tuple (K , K , 1, T, ·) . For the step, consider the sequence of strings from K T and K T , let K 1 T be the first name in the sequence having the form of a principal followed by T . Then it follows from the above lemma that P (K , K 1 , 1, T, ·) and it follows from the induction hypothesis that P (K 1 , K , 0, T, ·). Using 5-tuple reduction, P (K , K , 0, T, ·).
